

ARE AUDITOR REPUTATION EFFECTS DRIVEN

BY COMPETITIVE POACHING OR NEGATIVE MEDIA PUBLICITY?

This study tests whether auditor reputations are affected primarily by competitive poaching or by adverse media reports about auditors. Competitive poaching refers to the situation in which a rival audit office privately informs potential clients about the alleged audit failure of a competitor in an attempt to win clients from the tainted office. We find very strong evidence supporting the poaching effect whereas the effects of media publicity are relatively small. We conclude that auditor reputation effects are driven more by private communications from rival auditors rather than adverse stories in the media.

 **9 January 2024 (Tuesday)**

 **10:30am - 12:00noon**

 **SEK210, 2/F, Simon & Eleanor Kwok Building**

 **English**

SPEAKER

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Mr. Qu Jinxing is currently a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Accountancy at the City University of Hong Kong. Prior to enrolling as a Ph.D. student, he earned a bachelor's degree in accounting from Tsinghua University. His research interests broadly lie in auditing, litigation, accounting regulation, corporate governance, and financial disclosure. Specifically, he is working on issues related to how audit failures (such as litigation and restatements) and regulations discipline auditors' behavior and how these factors influence the audit market and the financial disclosure practices of companies. He has several papers which are under revision and review in premier academic journals.

